Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes with truncations at the match point are all stable in the college admissions problem. Further, all true stable matchings can be achieved in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium with truncations at the match point.
Introduction
A great number of impossibility theorems have shown the fundamental di±culty to design an e±cient mechanism under which players have the best interests to reveal their true preferences.
These theorems imply that when players are confronted with a game induced by such a mechanism, players have incentive to manipulate their reported preferences. Since misreported information is di®erent from the underlying truth, the objective of a designed mechanism may well be distorted by the misreported information. This calls up a question how the objective of a designed mechanism can be ful¯lled with the misreported information. This paper studies this issue for a class of stable (core) matching mechanisms in the context of the college admissions problem.
In the college admissions problem Roth's impossibility theorems show that no stable matching mechanism exists that makes it a dominant strategy for all players to state their true preferences.
Moreover, Roth showed that any individually rational matching can be supported by some Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a stable matching mechanism. Clearly, not all individually rational matchings are stable with respect to the true preferences. Thus, there are chances for a stable matching mechanism that generates a stable matching for each reported preference pro¯le to generate unstable matchings with respect to the true preferences in Nash equilibrium.
The potential problem for a stable matching mechanism to generate unstable matchings with respect to the true preferences is in the contrast with the empirical¯ndings in Roth (1984a Roth ( , 1990b Roth ( , 1991 , which showed that the centralized matching mechanisms in the labor markets for new physicians that generate stable matchings with respect to each reported preference pro¯le have succeeded to resolve the market failures, while matching mechanisms that generate unstable matchings with respect to the reported preferences have typically failed. The empirical evidences strongly support the hypothesis that a centralized stable matching mechanism may produce a stable matching with respect to not only the reported preferences but also the true preferences. Then, under what conditions does a stable matching mechanism always generate a true stable matching?
Our¯rst focus is on the rematching proof and strong equilibrium. In the marriage problem, Ma (1995) showed that all rematching strong equilibrium outcomes are stable; Ma (1994) and Shin and Suh (1996) showed that all strong equilibrium outcomes are stable; SÄ onmez (1997) generalized these results to the G-proof Nash equilibrium for the G-core. But we¯nd that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are not always stable in the college admissions problem, unlike the marriage problem. Therefore, we consider a class of simple strategies called truncations by Roth and Vande Vate (1991) and Roth and Rothblum (1996) . A truncation strategy for a student or a college is a preference ordering which is order-consistent with his or her true preference but has fewer acceptable colleges or students. This class of strategies exclude some complicated strategies like the changes in orders that may be pro¯table in manipulation. But Roth and Rothblum (1996) showed why it is plausible for players to consider this class of pro¯table strategies in truncations in manipulation, when players have very little information about the preferences of other players. But examples exist such that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes with truncations are not stable. Therefore, we use the truncations at the match point (e.g., deleting the (k+1)th and higher choices if a student is matched to his kth choice) in Roth and Peranson (1997b) . We show that examples exist such that a Nash equilibrium outcome with truncations at the match point are not stable. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes with truncations at the match point are all stable.
Our result provides a support for the hypothesis illustrated above to some degree. Our result shows that some meaningful re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium exists such that all outcomes in the re¯ned equilibrium notion are stable. On the other side, truncations at the match point are required in order to obtain a stable matching in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium.
This may be objected on the ground that truncations at the match point are too strong, since players may need information about the outcome at the match point before reporting truncations at the match point. This objection may not be that sever. Roth and Peranson (1997b) conducted a number of experiments on truncations at the match point to see how they may a®ect outcomes in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Their experiments were conducted for both the hospital and applicant proposing algorithms for the 1993, 1994, and 1995 matches; see Appendix B in Roth and Peranson (1997b) for detail. They found that \[i]n the majority of cases no change was produced when all ROLs [preferences] were truncated at the match point; and in no case were more than 3 applicants a®ected by such truncations" (Roth and Peranson (1997b) , pp. 26) for both algorithms, among approximately 20,000 jobs¯lled each year. Their experiments suggest that players in the NRMP market may in fact report preferences (i.e., ROLs, Rank Order Lists) that are equivalent to the truncations at the match point. Our result shows that if, in addition, the reported preferences form a rematching proof or strong equilibrium, then we may con¯dently conclude that the outcome from the NRMP may indeed be a true stable matching.
Our second focus is why the core is so small in the Nash equilibrium. It is known that the set of stable matchings (the core) in the college admissions problem forms a lattice under the common interests of students due to the common interests of colleges. This implies that the stable matching preferred most by all students is the worst stable matching for all colleges and the stable matching preferred most by all colleges is the worst stable matching for all students. Further, the size of the lattice can grow exponentially as the sizes of the market grow. Since the set of stable matchings is potentially large, which stable matching should be selected? This issue is so important that the pre-existing hospital proposing algorithm implemented since 1951 in the NRMP market is recently replaced by the applicant proposing algorithm; see Roth (1996) and Roth and Peranson (1997a,b) .
The empirical studies in Roth and Peranson (1997a,b) found that the set of stable matchings in the NRMP is in fact quite small. For the same set of reported preferences, the switch from the original hospital proposing algorithm to the new applicant proposing algorithm only a®ected few applicants (approximately 0.1%). This is surprising and it is in the sharp contrast with the theory, since the size of jobs¯lled in the NRMP market is quite large. Roth and Peranson (1997b) provided two insights why the core may be small. They argued that the small core may be due to the high correlation in preferences (e.g., two new physicians in the same¯eld may have quite similar preferences over positions) and the fact that applicants and hospitals can only conduct a limited number of interviews. Here we provide one more evidence why the core may be \small" when students and colleges report their preferences strategically. We show that any Nash equilibrium in truncations contains one and only one matching (stable or not). Therefore, the core must be small in Nash equilibrium in truncations. Interestingly, there may exist more than one matching at a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, any Nash equilibrium can only admit at most one true stable matching. Further, if, indeed, a Nash equilibrium admits a true stable matching, then no unstable matching can be the equilibrium outcome. That is, the true stable matching will always be the outcome, no matter how the equilibrium pro¯le is manipulated (not necessarily in truncations), as long as the equilibrium pro¯le admits a true stable matching. Therefore, a necessary and su±cient condition for the stable matching rule to be implemented in a subset of Nash equilibrium by a direct revelation game induced by a stable matching mechanism is that every equilibrium pro¯le in that subset admits one and only one true stable matching; see Theorem 11.
Our study is largely motivated by the signi¯cant empirical works in the labor markets made by Professor Alvin Roth and his co-authors. The¯rst issue is related to the implementation of the stable matching rule with manipulation, a question articulated in Roth (1984b Roth ( , 1990a for the marriage problem; also see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) (henceforth, RS) . This question has motivated the studies in Alcalde (1996) , Kara and SÄ onmez (1996) , Ma (1994 Ma ( ,1995 , Roth (1984b) , Shin and Suh (1996) , and SÄ onmez (1997) . These papers study the marriage problem. Kara and SÄ onmez (1997) studied the college admissions problem and showed that the stable matching rule is essentially monotone. Therefore the stable matching rule is implementable in Nash equilibrium via a result in Danilov (1992) . Their game form is quite di®erent from the one studied in this paper.
With our game form, the stable matching rule is not Nash implementable.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the college admissions problem. Section 3 shows the main result about stable matchings. Section 4 shows the results about the small core. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The College Admissions Problem
We use some de¯nitions from RS. The college admissions problem consists of two¯nite and disjoint sets, S = fS 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S n g of students and C = fC 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; C r g of colleges, with each college C j 2 C a quota q C j¸1 of enrollments. Each student S i 2 S is enrolled in at most one college. Each student S i 2 S has strict preferences P S i over colleges C [ fS i g and each college C j 2 C has strict preferences P C j over individual students S [ fC j g. Both P S i and P C j leave the possibility that a student may prefer not to be enrolled in some colleges and a college may prefer not to enroll some students. Let R S i and R C j denote the weak preferences associated with P S i and P C j respectively.
Let -S i denote the set of all strict preferences for a student S i 2 S and -C j denote the set of all strict preferences over individual students for a college C j . Let -=
the set of all preference pro¯les. The marriage problem is the college admissions problem with
De¯ne an unordered family of elements of any set X to be a collection of elements in which the order is immaterial. The set of unordered families of elements of X is denoted by X.
De¯nition. Let ¹;¸2 M be two matchings. We say that a preference ¹ P C j for a college C j over sets of students is responsive to its preference P C j over individual students if, whenever
Gale and Shapley (1962) originated the study of the college admissions problem. Roth (1985) re-formulated the problem and introduced the responsive preferences. Responsive preferences uniquely determine preferences over individuals but not vice versa. Henceforth, we assume that colleges' preferences over groups of students are responsive, complete, and transitive. We always use ¹ P C j with a bar for college C j 's preferences over groups of students that are responsive and P C j without a bar for college C j 's preferences over individual students. No confusion will be made.
A pair of student S i and college C j blocks a matching ¹ if they are not matched under ¹ but student S i prefers college C j to his mate ¹(S i ) and college C j prefers student S i to some member
by any pairs of student and college; (c) stable if it is both individually rational and pairwise stable.
Let S(P ) and IR(P ) denote the set of all stable matchings and the set of all individually rational matchings respectively with respect to a pro¯le P 2 -.
De¯nition.
A matching mechanism Ã : -! M is a map from pro¯les to matchings. A matching mechanism ' : -! M is stable if '(Q) 2 S(Q) for all Q 2 -. Let © denote the set of all stable matching mechanisms.
It follows from Lemma 5.6 in RS that S(P ) is nonempty for any pro¯le P 2 -. Therefore, the set of stable matching mechanisms © is nonempty. A stable matching mechanism ' 2 © and an underlying true pro¯le P 2 -induce a normal form game ¡('; P ). The set -=
the set of strategies of the game ¡('; P ). We consider three equilibrium notions in pure strategies of this game.
De¯nition. A pro¯le Q 2 -is a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of a game ¡('; P ) if
De¯nition. A pro¯le Q is a strong equilibrium of a game ¡('; P ) if it has the property that
for all k 2 T \ S and all l 2 T \ C.
Let N('; P ) (N rp ('; P ), N s ('; P )) denote the set of all Nash (rematching proof, strong) equilibria of the game ¡('; P ).
Stable Matchings
Since the true preferences are private information, a stable matching mechanism has to work with the reported preferences. Roth's impossibility theorems show that there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes it a dominant strategy for all students and colleges to report their true preferences. This implies that when students and colleges are confronted with a game ¡('; P ) induced by a stable matching mechanism ', the reported preferences may well be di®erent from the true preferences. Therefore, the stable matching produced by a stable matching mechanism with respect to a misreported preference pro¯le may well be unstable with respect to the underlying true preference pro¯le. Indeed, Roth showed that all individually rational matchings can be supported as Nash equilibrium outcomes for any stable matching mechanism: Given any ' 2 ©,
every P 2 -. But many Nash equilibrium outcomes are not stable with respect to the true pro¯le P .
In the marriage problem, Ma (1995) showed that all rematching proof equilibrium outcomes are stable: Given any ' 2 ©, '(N rp ('; P )) ½ S(P ) for all P 2 -. Ma (1994) and Shin and Suh (1996) studied the strong equilibrium (due to Aumann) and showed that all strong equilibrium outcomes are stable: Given any ' 2 ©, '(N s ('; P )) ½ S(P ) for all P 2 -. SÄ onmez (1997) introduced the Gcore and the G-proof Nash equilibrium and generalized these results for the marriage problem. The these results do not apply to the college admissions problem; as shown in the following example.
Example 1. Let C = fC 1 ; C 2 g, S = fS 1 ; S 2 g, q C1 = 2; q C2 = 1. Let
and let ' be any stable matching mechanism. Let
Then
We now show that (P ¡C1 ; Q C1 ) is a strong equilibrium. To prove this, it is su±cient to consider the coalition fC 1 ; S 1 ; S 2 g since C 2 cannot be better. To make C 1 better o®, C 1 should be matched with S 1 and S 2 . But this does not make student S 1 better o®. To make S 1 better o®, S 1 must be matched with C 2 . But then it is impossible to make C 1 better o®. Similarly, one can check the coalitions such as fC 1 ; S 2 g and fS 1 ; S 2 g. This shows that (P ¡C 1 ; Q C 1 ) is a Nash, rematching proof, and strong equilibrium for the true pro¯le P but '(P ¡C 1 ; Q C 1 ) is not stable for P .
This example shows that the college admissions problem is di®erent from the marriage problem.
Some additional conditions are needed for both rematching proof and strong equilibrium to generate stable matchings.
We follow Roth and Vande Vate (1991) and Roth and Rothblum (1996) to introduce a class of simple strategies called truncations. This class of strategies are introduced for the marriage problem in these papers. A college C j is acceptable to a student
is acceptable for a college C j if S i R C j C j . A truncation strategy Q S i (with respect to P S i ) for a student S i contains k (0 · k) acceptable colleges such that the¯rst k elements of Q S i are the¯rst k elements, with the same order, in her true preference P S i , and the (k + 1)th element in Q S i is S i . The ordering after the (k + 1)th element S i in Q S i does not matter for our studies. Similarly, a truncation strategy Q C j for a college C j (with respect to P C j ) contains k (0 · k) acceptable students such that the¯rst k elements of Q C j are the¯rst k elements, with the same order, in her true preference P C j , and the (k + 1)th element in Q C j is C j . Again the ranking order after C j does not matter. For example, the equilibrium strategy Q C1 in Example 1 is a truncation strategy for college C 1 .
Truncation strategies exclude some other more complicated strategies such as the changes in orders that may be pro¯table for manipulation. Roth and Rothblum (1996) showed that more complicated and pro¯table strategies other than truncations do exist. But they also show that players need to know all preferences of the other players in order to exploit the bene¯ts of such complicated strategies in manipulation. They convincingly showed why this class of simple strategies of truncations are plausible for the marriage problem in an environment with low information about the preferences of all other players. In the Sorority rush market Mongell and Roth (1989) found that truncation strategies are in fact used by players in practice: Players often truncate after their¯rst choice.
A Nash equilibrium Q of a game ¡('; P ) is a Nash equilibrium in truncations if all equilibrium strategies are truncations. The equilibrium pro¯le (P ¡C1 ; Q C i ) in Example 1 is a Nash, rematching proof, and strong equilibrium in truncations. Example 1 shows that a Nash, rematching proof, and strong equilibrium outcome in truncations may be unstable. Therefore, some additional conditions are required to re¯ne this class of equilibrium strategies. We introduce a class of strategies in truncations at the match point; see Roth and Peranson (1997b) . We say that Q is a Nash equilibrium in truncations at the match point if the kth element in Q S i for student S i is the college ' S i (Q) or Q S i is any truncation strategy in the case that ' S i (Q) = S i , and the kth element in Q C j for college C j is the student that is the least preferred by the college C j among all students in ' C j (Q) or Q C j is any truncation strategy in the case that ' C j (Q) does not contain any student. An equilibrium is an equilibrium in truncations at the match point if all equilibrium strategies are truncations at the match point. For example, the equilibrium strategies Q C 1 , P S 1 , and P S 2 are all truncation strategies at the match point in Example 1; The equilibrium strategy P C 2 is a truncation strategy but not a truncation strategy at the match point; Thus, the equilibrium pro¯le (P ¡C 1 ; Q C 1 ) is not an equilibrium in truncations at the match point.
One may wonder whether truncations at the match point in Nash equilibrium are strong enough to generate stable matchings. The following example shows that the answer is negative.
Example 2 (Roth and Vande Vate (1991)). Let S = (S
Let, i; j = 1; 2, the true pro¯le P is as follows:
Now consider the following Nash equilibrium Q:
Then the matching
is the unique stable matching for Q. Thus '(Q) = ¹ for any stable matching mechanism '. The pro¯le Q is a Nash equilibrium in truncations at the match point. But ¹ is not stable for P .
Proposition 3 below shows that all rematching proof equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are stable. This is in the contrast to Examples 1 and 2 above. Since a strong equilibrium is also rematching proof, it follows that all strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are stable as well.
Proposition 3. Let ('; P ) 2 © £ -and Q be a rematching proof equilibrium in truncations at the match point. Then '(Q) is a stable matching in S(P ).
Proof. Let ('; P ) 2 © £ -. Let Q be a rematching proof equilibrium in truncations at the match point. Suppose on the contrary that '(Q) 6 2 S(P ). Then 9(S i ; C j ) 2 S £ C such that
Note that q · q C j .
We discuss four cases.
Case a. ' S i (Q) 6 = S i and C j 6 2 ' C j (Q).
Because S i P C j ¾ for some student ¾ 2 ' C j (Q) and Q C j is a truncation of P C j up to S iq , it follows that S i Q C j S iq . This shows that (S i ; C j ) blocks '(Q) with respect to Q contradicting '(Q) 2 S(Q).
Since Q C j is a truncation of P C j , the assumption that
and Q S i is a truncation of P S i , it follows that
Thus there exists a student
It follows that either
Either case implies that
contradicting Q is a Nash equilibrium.
We show that
(S i ; C j ) blocks '(Q) with respect toQ.) But this is impossible since ' C j (Q) ½ fS i 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S iq g and
Let¸(
By the construction ofQ and¸,¸2 S(Q) since any blocking (S k ; C l ) of¸with respect toQ is also a blocking pair of '(Q) with respect to Q. We need to show that ' C j (Q) =¸(C j ). To show this, we show that ¹(C j ) =¸(C j ) for every ¹ 2 S(Q). We consider two situations.
(a). C j 2¸(C j ). Theorem 5.13 in RS shows that any college that does not¯ll its quota at some stable matching is assigned the same set of students at every stable matching. Therefore it follows from Theorem 5.13 in RS that ¹(C j ) =¸(C j ) for every ¹ 2 S(Q).
(b). C j 6 2¸(C j ). This implies that¸(C j ) = fS i 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S iq ; S i g and q = q C j ¡ 1. Suppose that
shows that ¹(C j ) =¸(C j ), a contradiction. Therefore both cases show that ¹(C j ) =¸(C j ) for
Now, since ¹ P C j is responsive and S i P C j C j , it follows that
contradicting Q is rematching proof. Complete the proof of case (c).
But then this implies that '(Q) 6 2 S(Q) since (S i ; C j ) blocks '(Q) with respect toQ. Therefore
and at least one student
and the fact that Q S k is a truncation of
truncation of P C l at the match point and there is no such a student S k between the student ¾ and
Therefore, this shows that
Since ¹ P C j is responsive and S i P C j C j , we have that
contradicting Q is rematching proof. This completes the proof of Case d.
The next question is whether a rematching proof or strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point exists. The answer is yes. In fact our next result shows that every stable matching can be achieved in at least one strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point.
Let N trp ('; P ) and N ts ('; P ) denote the set of all rematching proof and strong equilibria in truncations at the match point respectively of the game ¡('; P ). As a corollary of Proposition 4, it follows that S(P ) ½ '(N trp ('; P )).
Proof. Let ¹ 2 S(P ). Denote
Let Q be a truncation pro¯le at the match point such that
Then '(Q) = ¹ for all ' 2 © since S(Q) = f¹g. We claim that the truncation pro¯le Q at the match point is a strong equilibrium in N ts ('; P ) for all ' 2 ©.
Suppose on the contrary that there exists some stable matching mechanism ' such that there
the set of all students who prefer '(Q) to '(Q) and
the set of all colleges that prefer '(Q) to '(Q). Clearly T ½ T 1 [ T 2 . We consider two cases below.
(a). T 2 6 = ;. For any college C j in T 2 , by the responsiveness of ¹ P C j and (2), there exist a
and then (¾; C j ) blocks ¹ with respect to P contradicting ¹ 2 S(P ). Thus ¾ 6 2 T 1 .
Note that ¾ 6 = C j since ¾ is a student. It follows that ' ¾ (Q)P ¾ C j .
We obtain that
But this is impossible because there does not exist C j between ' ¾ (Q) and ¾ by the construction
The assumption that T 2 = ; implies that T ½ S. By the construction of Q C l , it follows that
Since Q C l is a truncation of P C l , we also have that
Either case implies that (S i ; C l ) blocks ¹ with respect to P contradicting ¹ 2 S(P ).
We may summarize the results in Propositions 3 and 4 as follows.
Theorem 5 (Stable Matchings). The stable matching correspondence S : -! M can be implemented by any direct revelation mechanism (
, where the outcome function ' is a stable matching mechanism in ©, in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium in truncation strategies at the match point.
Proof. Proposition 3 shows that '(N trp ('; P )) ½ S(P ). Proposition 4 shows that S(P ) ½ '(N ts ('; P )). The proof is complete since a strong equilibrium is also rematching proof.
Remark. Theorem 5 does show that there are some meaningful re¯nements of the Nash equilibrium that generate stable matchings even though the equilibrium pro¯les are manipulated. This provides a support for the hypothesis that a stable matching mechanism that generates a stable matching with respect to the report preference pro¯les may in fact generate stable matchings with respect to the true preferences. This in turn provides some important economic insights to the empirical evidences discovered by Roth (1984a Roth ( , 1990b Roth ( , 1991 in a large number of labor markets to some degree. But our result also reveals the di±culty in order to obtain true stable matchings from the misreported preferences. Both truncations at the match point and the rematching proof or strong equilibrium are needed to generate true stable matchings. The class of truncation strategies are simple and plausible. But the truncations at the match point may be objected on the ground that players need information to know the match point before reporting such strategies. Therefore, it is quite surprising to know from the experiments conducted in Roth and Peranson (1997b) for the NRMP markets in the 1993, 1994, and 1995 matches that the actual outcome of the hospital and applicant proposing algorithms is in fact equivalent to the outcome as if all reported strategies are truncations at the match point. Thus, even if the actual reportings may not be truncations at the match point, the reportings are equivalent to truncations at the match point in outcomes.
Therefore, if the reporting strategies also form a rematching proof equilibrium, then it follows from Theorem 5 that the outcome can be a true stable matching. Hence, our results in Theorem 5
provide important insights to the empirical evidences.
The Small Core in Nash Equilibrium
In theory, the number of stable matchings in S(P ) may grow exponentially as the sizes of the market grow; see Theorem 3.18 in RS. In contrast, Roth and Peranson (1997a,b) found that the set of stable matchings (the core) in the NRMP market is in fact quite small. For the same set of reported ranking order lists, the pre-existing NRMP algorithm and the new applicant proposing algorithm generate almost the same outcome. Quite few applicants (approximately 0.1%) are a®ected after the switch from the pre-existing NRMP algorithm to the applicant proposing algorithm. This calls up a question why the core is so small.
Let '(Q) be a stable matching with respect to a Nash equilibrium pro¯le Q of the game ¡('; P ).
Lemma 6 shows that no other stable matching ¹ in S(Q) exists such that some college C j prefers
Lemma 6. Suppose Q 2 N ('; P ) is a Nash equilibrium, where ' 2 ©. Then for any matching ¹ 2 S(Q),
for every S i 2 S and
Proof. First, suppose on the contrary that ¹(
). Theorem 5.12 in RS shows that the set of students employed is the same at every stable matching. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 5.12 that
Thus
i.e.,
contradicting Q is a Nash equilibrium. Now suppose on the contrary that there exists some C j 2 C such that
Then let fS
, this implies that (S i ;C j ) blocks ¹ with respect to Q contradicting ¹ 2 S(Q).
We want to show that
, which implies that
We now show that¸(
(a) C j 2 ¹(C j ). Now Theorem 5.13 in RS shows that any college that does not¯ll its quota at some stable matching is assigned precisely the same set of students at every stable matching.
Therefore, it follows from Theorem 5.13 that for all¸2 S(Q ¡C j ; Q
. But this implies, by Theorem 5.13 in RS again, that ¹(C j ) =¸(C j ), a contradiction to the assumption. Therefore¸(C j ) = ¹(C j ) for alļ
). This completes the proof.
Is it possible for a Nash equilibrium to admit more than one matching? The following example provides a negative answer to this.
Suppose P is as follows:
The following Q is a Nash equilibrium of the game ¡('; P ), where ' is the student proposing algorithm.
Thus, the core at a Nash equilibrium Q does not always contain a unique matching. Thus, the core may not be small at a Nash equilibrium. But Theorem 8 shows that every Nash equilibrium in truncations contains one and only one matching, stable or not. Therefore, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations (not necessarily truncations at the match point) must be small. It contains a unique outcome. It should be noted that a Nash equilibrium in truncations may not be stable; see Example 2.
Theorem 8 (Small Core). Let ('; P ) 2 © £ -and Q 2 N('; P ) be a Nash equilibrium in
Proof. Suppose there exists ¹ 2 S(Q) such that ¹ 6 = '(Q). Then, by Lemma 6,
for all S i 2 S with ' S i (Q) 6 = ¹(S i ). Since Q 2 -is a truncation of P , we also obtain that
) (all such students are matched with colleges).
Theorem 5.33 in RS shows that S(Q) forms a lattice under the common preferences of colleges, ¹ Q C , and dual to the common preferences of students, Q S . Therefore we have
for all C j such that ¹(C j ) 6 = ' C j (Q), since students prefer '(Q) to ¹ in Q S .
Theorem 5.13 in RS shows that any college that does not¯ll its quota at some stable matching is assigned the same set of students at every stable matching. For every C j such that ¹(C j ) 6 = ' C j (Q), it follows from Theorem 5.13 that ¹(C j ) ½ S and ' C j (Q) ½ S:
It follows from (3), (4), and responsive preferences that college C j prefers at least one student in ¹(C j ) to a student in ' C j (Q). Then Lemma 5.25 in RS shows that college C j weakly prefers all students in ¹(C j ) to all students in ' C j (Q) in the related marriage problem. It follows from Lemma
in RS that
for all C j such that ¹(C j ) 6 = ' C j (Q), since Q C j is a truncation of P C j . This is a contradiction to Lemma 6.
Given a stable matching mechanism ' 2 © and a pro¯le P 2 -, the matching '(Q) is stable with respect to the pro¯le Q 2 -. But the matching '(Q) may or may not be stable for P . Of course, if the matching '(Q) is stable with respect to the pro¯le P , then S(Q) contains at least one stable matching in S(P ). But the set S(Q) may contain more than one element in S(P ). The next result shows that if '(Q) is stable for P , then there exists no other matching in S(Q) that is also stable for P .
Lemma 9. For every Nash equilibrium Q 2 N ('; P ) such that '(Q) 2 S(P ), S(Q) \ S(P ) = f'(Q)g.
Proof.
Suppose that j S(Q) \ S(P ) j> 1. Thus there exists ¹ 2 S(Q) \ S(P ) such that ' k (Q) 6 = ¹(k) for some k 2 S [ C. Theorem 5.26 in RS shows that a college C j is indi®erent (over groups of students) between ¹ and '(Q) only if ¹(C j ) = ' C j (Q). It follows that either
for all C j 2 C with ' C j (Q) 6 = ¹(C j ). Then Lemma 6 shows that
for all S i 2 S with ' S i (Q) 6 = ¹(S i ) and
for all C j 2 C with ' C j (Q) 6 = ¹(C j ). But this contradicts Theorem 5.33 in RS which shows that if all students prefer '(Q) to ¹, then all colleges prefer ¹ to '(Q).
Let us summarize what we may learn from this study about stable matchings in manipulated Nash equilibria. We show that every Nash equilibrium pro¯le admits at most one true stable matching.
If, indeed, a Nash equilibrium admits such a matching, then the true stable matching will always be achieved, even though a Nash equilibrium may admit some other unstable matchings; see Theorem 11. Moreover, any Nash equilibrium in truncations contains one and only one matching, stable or not; see Theorem 9. Since the set of stable matchings coincides with the core, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations must be \small".
Examples exist such that the Nash, rematching proof, and strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations are unstable; see Example 1. But we show that there are a large class of rematching proof and strong equilibria in truncations at the match point whose outcomes are all stable; see Proposition 3. Moreover, all stable matchings are supported in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point; see Proposition 4. Examples also exist such that Nash equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are unstable; see Example 2. We hope that these results provide insights to the noted empirical¯ndings in the literature in a great number of labor markets, e.g., Roth (1984a Roth ( , 1990b Roth ( , 1991 and Roth and Peranson (1997a,b) .
